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Abstract
We present a simple agent-based model to study the development of a bubble and
the consequential crash and investigate how their proximate triggering factor might
relate to their fundamental mechanism, and vice versa. Our agents invest according
to their opinion on future price movements, which is based on three sources of in-
formation, (i) public information, i.e. news, (ii) information from their “friendship”
network and (iii) private information. Our bounded rational agents continuously
adapt their trading strategy to the current market regime by weighting each of
these sources of information in their trading decision according to its recent pre-
dicting performance. We find that bubbles originate from a random lucky streak
of positive news, which, due to a feedback mechanism of these news on the agents’
strategies develop into a transient collective herding regime. After this self-amplified
exuberance, the price has reached an unsustainable high value, being corrected by
a crash, which brings the price even below its fundamental value. These ingredients
provide a simple mechanism for the excess volatility documented in financial mar-
kets. Paradoxically, it is the attempt for investors to adapt to the current market
regime which leads to a dramatic amplification of the price volatility. A positive
feedback loop is created by the two dominating mechanisms (adaptation and imi-
tation) which, by reinforcing each other, result in bubbles and crashes. The model
offers a simple reconciliation of the two opposite (herding versus fundamental) pro-
posals for the origin of crashes within a single framework and justifies the existence
of two populations in the distribution of returns, exemplifying the concept that
crashes are qualitatively different from the rest of the price moves.
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1 Introduction
Bubbles and crashes in financial markets are events that are fascinating to
academics and practitioners alike. According to the consecrated academic
view that markets are efficient, bubbles, being temporally persistent, self-
reenforcement deviations of the price from the fundamental value, are impos-
sible. And crashes should only result from the revelation of a dramatic piece
of information. Yet in reality, there is a large consensus both from professionals
(Dudley, 2010; Trichet, 2010) and academia (Shiller, 2000; Abreu and Brunnermeier,
2003) that bubbles do exist, and even the most thorough post-mortem anal-
yses are typically inconclusive as to what piece of information might have
triggered the observed crash (Barro et al., 1989).
It is often observed that crashes occur soon after a long run-up of prices, re-
ferred to as a bubble. A crash is thus often the burst of the bubble. There is a
vast amount of literature aiming at characterizing the underlying origin(s) and
mechanism(s) of financial bubbles (Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003; Kaufman,
2001; Sheffrin, 2005; Shiller, 2000; Sornette, 2003a) but there is still no con-
sensus in the academic community on what is really a bubble and what are
its characteristic properties. Bubbles do not seem to be fully explained by
bounded rationality (Levine and Zajac, 2007), speculation (Lei et al., 2001)
or the uncertainty in the market (Smith et al., 1988). Finally, there is no re-
ally satisfactory theory of bubbles, which both encompasses its different possi-
ble mechanisms and adheres to reasonable economic principles (no arbitrage,
equilibrium, bounded rationality, ...).
Most approaches to explain crashes search for possible mechanism or ef-
fects that operate at very short time scales (hours, days, or weeks at most).
Other mechanisms concentrate on learning an exogenously given crash rate
(Sandroni, 1998). Here, we build on the radically different hypothesis sum-
marized in (Sornette, 2003a) that the underlying cause of the crash should
be found in the preceding months and years, in the progressively increasing
build-up of a characteristic that we refer to as ‘market cooperation’, which
expresses the growth of the correlation between investors’ decisions leading
to stronger effective interactions between them as a result of several positive
feedback mechanisms. According to this point of view, the proximal triggering
factor for price collapse should be clearly distinguished from the fundamental
factor. A crash occurs because the market has entered an unstable phase to-
ward the culmination of a bubble and any small disturbance or process may
reveal the existence of the instability. Think of a ruler held up vertically on
your finger: this very unstable position will lead eventually to its collapse, as
a result of a small (or an absence of adequate) motion of your hand or due
to any tiny whiff of air. This is the proximal cause of the collapse. But the
fundamental cause should be attributed to the intrinsically unstable position.
2
What is then the origin of the maturing instability? Many studies have sug-
gested that bubbles result from the over-optimistic expectation of future earn-
ings and history provides a significant number of examples of bubbles driven by
such unrealistic expectations (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Sheffrin, 2005;
Sornette, 2003a). These studies and many others show that bubbles are ini-
tially nucleated at times of burgeoning economic fundamentals in so-called
“new economy” climates. This vocable refers to new opportunities and/or
new technological innovations. But, because there are large uncertainties con-
cerning present values of the economies that will result from the present inno-
vations, investors are more prone to influences from their peers (Hong et al.,
2005), the media, and other channels that combine to build a self-reflexive
climate of (over-)optimism (Umpleby, 2007). In particular, these interactions
may lead to significant imitation, herding and collective behaviors. Herding
due to technical as well as behavioral mechanisms creates positive feedback
mechanisms, which lead to self-organized cooperation and the development of
possible instabilities or to the “building of castles in the air”, to paraphrase
Malkiel (Malkiel, 1990). This idea is probably best exemplified in the context
of the Internet bubble culminating in 2000 or the recent the CDO bubble in
the USA peaking in 2007, where the new economies where the Internet or com-
plex derivatives on sub-prime mortgages building on accelerating real-estate
valuations.
Based on these ideas, the present paper adds to the literature by providing
a detailed analysis of how the proximate triggering factor of a crash might
relate to its fundamental mechanism in terms of a global cooperative herding
mechanism. In particular, we rationalize the finding of Cutler et al. (1989) that
exogenous news are responsible for no more than a third of the variance of
the returns and that major financial crises are not preceded by any particular
dramatic news.
In a nutshell, our multi-period many agent-based model is designed as follows.
At each time step t, each investor forms an opinion on the next-period value of
a single stock traded on the market. This opinion is shaped by weighting and
combining three sources of information available at time t: (i) public infor-
mation, i.e. news, (ii) information from their “friendship” network, promoting
imitation and (iii) private information. In addition, we assume that the agents
adapt their strategy, i.e., the relative importance of these different sources of
information according to how well they performed in the past in predicting
the next-time step valuation.
The a priori sensible qualities of our agents to gather all possible information
and adapt to the recent past turn out to backfire. As their decisions are aggre-
gated in the market, their collective impact leads to the nucleation of transient
phases of herding with positive feedbacks. These nucleations occur as a result
of random occurrences of short runs of same signed news. Our main findings
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can thus be summarized as follows: rallies and crashes occur due to random
lucky or unlucky streaks of news that are amplified by the feedback of the news
on the agents’ strategies into collective transient herding regimes. In addition
to providing a convincing mechanism for bubbles and crashes, our model also
provides a simple explanation for the excess volatility puzzle (Shiller, 1981).
Before presenting the model and its results, it is useful to compare it with
the relevant literature and related models. A related line of research aims at
developing a theory of “convention” (Orle´an, 1984, 1986, 1989a,b, 1991, 1995),
which emphasizes that even the concept of “fundamental value” may be a con-
vention established by positive and negative feedbacks in a social system. A
first notable implementation by Topol (1991) proposes a model with an addi-
tive learning process between an ‘agent-efficient’ price dynamics and a mimetic
contagion dynamics. Similar to our own set-up, the agents of Topol (1991) ad-
just their bid-ask prices by combining the information from the other buyers’
bid prices, the other sellers’ ask prices and the agent’s own efficient price corre-
sponding to his knowledge of the economic fundamentals. Topol (1991) shows
that mimetic contagion provides a mechanism for excess volatility. Another
implementation of the concept of convention by Wyart and Bouchaud (2007)
shows that agents who use strategies based on the past correlations between
some news and returns may actually produce by their trading decisions the
very correlation that they postulated, even when there is no a priori economic
basis for such correlation. The fact that agents trade on the basis of how the
information forecasts the return is reminiscent of our model, with however
several important differences. The first important conceptual change is that
Wyart and Bouchaud (2007) use a representative agent approach (in contrast
with our heterogeneous agent framework), so that effect of imitation through
the social network is neglected. The second difference is in the agent’s calcu-
lation of the correlation to adapt their strategies. In (Wyart and Bouchaud,
2007), agents’ strategies are controlled by the correlation between the news and
the return resulting immediately from their aggregate action based on those
news (taking into account the agents’ own impact). Our agents’ strategies are
determined by the correlation between their information and the return one
time step later, which embodies the more realistic situation, in which a postion
first has to be open and then closed a time step later for the trade’s payoff to
be observed.
Another closely related line of research is known as “information cascades”.
According to (Bikhchandani et al., 1992), “an informational cascade occurs
when it is optimal for an individual having observed the action of those ahead
of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard
to his own information”. In these models, agents know that they have only
limited information and use their neighbors actions in order to complement
their information set. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) showed that the fact that
agents use the decisions of other agents to make their own decision will lead
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with probability 1 to an informational cascade under conditions where the
decisions are sequential and irreversible. This model was later generalized by
Orle´an (1995) into a non-sequential version, where informational cascades were
still found to be possible.
The concept of information cascades is not new in modeling bubbles. Chari and Kehoe
(2003) developed a model where agents try to compensate their uncertainty
about the a priori fixed payoff of an asset by observing all other agents’ ac-
tions. In our model, agents are also using the opinions of their neighbors to
determine how to act but the reason behind this is different. Our agents are
not so much interested in the fundamental value of the stock, but more in
its future directions. They try to buy the asset before its price rises and sell
before it falls, making profit from the difference in the price. The true under-
lying equilibrium value is not the only important information to them, and
they are more clever than purely fundamental value investors. They recognize
that fundamental value is just one component among others that will set the
market price. They include the possibility that the price may deviate from
fundamental value, due to other behavioral factors. And they try to learn and
adapt to determine what are the dominant factors. In principle, they should
be able to discover the fundamental value and converge to its equilibrium. But
it is a fact that they do not in some circumstances, due to the amplification of
runs of positive or negative news in the presence of their collective behavior
when sufficiently strong. In the “information cascade” set-up, one assume that
the “truth” exists, that there is a true fundamental price or a correct choice
to be made which is exogenously given, and agents have no influence on the
outcome. In our model however the outcome, whether selling or buying a stock
was the right choice, is endogenously emerging from the aggregated choices of
all agents. There is no a priori right or wrong answer, it is decided during the
process. Moreover, the strength of the influence of her neighbors onto a given
agent is not constant in time. This influence by the social environment evolves
in time according to its past relevance and success.
A model for the formation of a boom followed by a crash was also developed
by Veldkamp (2005), where the price of an unknown company can rise only
slowly due to infrequent news coverage. If the company performs well resulting
in a slow boom, its susceptibility towards news increases as the media become
more aware of the successful company so that, eventually, a single piece of
bad news can induce a sudden crash. Although the subject of research is the
same, we show how a boom can also be formed with news not being constantly
positive and that a single piece of bad news does not necessarily lead to the
burst a bubble.
The endogenization of the sources of information onto the decisions of the
agents is inspired by the model of Zhou and Sornette (2007), which focuses
on herding and on the role of “irrational” mis-attribution of price moves to
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generate most of the stylized facts observed in financial time series. Similarly
to their model as well as many other artificial financial market models inves-
tigating the interaction between trading agents, our model is based on the
Ising model, one of the simplest models describing the competition between
the ordering force of imitation or contagion and the disordering impact of pri-
vate information or idiosyncratic noise that promotes heterogeneous decisions
(McCoy and Wu, 1973).
Our paper is organized into four sections. In Section 2, the detailed working
of the model is presented. The results are shown and discussed in section 3
and section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 General set-up
We consider a fixed universe of N agents who are trading (buying or selling)
a single asset, which can be seen as a stock, the market portfolio or any
other exchange traded asset. This asset is traded on an organized market,
coordinated by a market maker. At each time step, agents have the possibility
to either trade or to remain passive. The trading decision of a given agent is
based on her opinion on the future price development.
To form their opinion, agents use information from three different sources:
idiosyncratic opinion, global news and their network of acquaintances. In or-
der to adapt their decision making process to the current market situation,
they are weighting the different information sources by their respective past
predicting performance. Limited to these sources of information, our agents
act rationally, i.e., they use all information available to them to maximize
their profits. Since they use backward looking adapting strategies with finite
time horizons, our agents are boundedly rational, with limited competence,
resources and available time.
A limitation of the model is to assume that agents do not have access to more
liquidity than their initial wealth and that generated by their investments.
Moreover, our universe has a fixed population, so that there is no flux of new
“foreign” investors that may be attracted in the later stage of a bubble, and
who could inflate it up further (Sornette and Zhou, 2004; Zhou and Sornette,
2006, 2008). We thus purposefully remove one of the mechanisms, namely
the increasing credit availability and credit creation (Caginalp et al., 2001),
which has often been reported as an important ingredient to inflate historical
bubbles (Galbraith, 1997; Sornette, 2003b; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005).
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This allows us to focus on the role of decision processes with conflicting pieces
of information in the presence of local adaptation.
2.2 Three sources of information
At every time step, agents form anticipations concerning the future price move-
ments based on three sources information.
A first source of information of a given agent is her private information, ǫi(t),
which may reflect the unique access to information not available publicly or
the idiosyncratic, subjective view of the particular agent on how the stock will
perform in the future. The private information is different for every agent, is
taken uncorrelated across agents and time: the innovations ǫi(t) are normally
distributed (ǫi(t) ∼ N(0, 1)) and i.i.d.
A second source is the public information, n(t). Public information includes
economic, financial and geopolitical news that may influence the future eco-
nomic performance of the stock. To capture the idea that the public news,
n(t), is fully informational with no redundancy (Chaitin, 1987), we take n(t)
as a white Gaussian noise with unit variance, uncorrelated with the private
information {ǫi(t), i = 1, ..., N} of the agents. Although news are generated
as a stationary process, we will see that their impact on the agents evolves
because of the adaptive nature of the agents’ strategies.
The third source of information for a given agent is provided by the expected
decisions of other agents to whom she is connected in her social and pro-
fessional network. With limited access to information and finite computing
power (bounded rationality), it can be shown to be optimal to imitate others
(Orle´an, 1986; Roehner and Sornette, 2000). Moreover, there is clear empiri-
cal evidence that practitioners do imitate their colleagues (Hong et al., 2005).
In our model, agents gather information on the opinions of their neighbors
in their social network and incorporate it as an ingredient into their trading
decision.
Incorporating agent interaction in the opinion formation process leads to dy-
namics described by models derived from the Ising model. Many earlier works
have already borrowed concepts from the theory of the Ising models and of
phase transitions to model social interactions and organization, e.g. (Follmer,
1974; Callen and Shapero, 1974; Montroll and Badger, 1974). In particular,
Orle´an (Orle´an, 1984, 1986, 1989a,b, 1991, 1995) has captured the paradox
of combining rational and imitative behavior under the name “mimetic ratio-
nality,” by developing models of mimetic contagion of investors in the stock
markets which are based on irreversible processes of opinion forming.
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2.3 Opinion formation
Using the three sources of information described in the previous section, the
opinion of agent i at time t, ωi(t), consists of their weighted sum,
ωi(t) = c1i
J∑
j=1
kij(t− 1)Ei[sj(t)] + c2i u(t− 1)n(t) + c3i ǫi(t), (1)
where ǫi(t) represents the private information of agent i, n(t) is the public
information, J is the number of neighbors that agent i polls for their opinion
and Ei[sj(t)] is the expected action of the neighbor j estimated by agent i
at time t 1 . The functional form of expression (1) embodies our hypothesis
that an agent forms her opinion based on a combination of different sources of
information. This is a standard assumption in the social interaction literature
(Bischi et al., 2006; Brock and Durlauf, 2001) and decision making theory (see
for instance (Ko¨rding, 2006)).
To take into account the heterogeneity in trading style and preferences of
traders, we assume that each agent i is characterized by a triplet of fixed traits,
in the form of the weights (c1i, c2i, c3i) she attributes to each of the three pieces
of information (social network, news and idiosyncratic). The values (c1i, c2i, c3i)
for each agent are chosen randomly from three uniform distributions over the
respective intervals [0, C1], [0, C2] and [0, C3], at the initialization of the system.
In section 2.4, we will extend this heterogeneity by allowing for different risk
aversions.
In order to adapt to the recent market regime, each agent can modify the
weights she attributes to the information from each of her neighbor j, via the
factor kij(t), and to the public news, via the factor u(t). The factors kij(t)’s
and u(t) are updated such as to give more weight to an information source if
it was a good predictor in the recent past, and to decrease its influence in the
inverse case (more details in sec. 2.7). The idiosyncratic term is not weighted
and has a constant impact on agents actions.
Finally, for simplicity, our agents live on a virtual square lattice with J = 4
neighbors, with periodic boundary conditions. The reported results are not
sensitive to this topology, and hold for random as well as complete graphs.
1 We use a sequential updating mechanism with a random ordering. In this way,
when agent i polls her neighbors, she has a mix of opinions coming from those who
have already updated theirs and those have not yet. This procedure can be thought
of as a device to account for the large distribution of reactions times of humans
(Vazquez et al., 2006; Crane et al., 2010).
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2.4 Trading decision
Until now, we have introduced heterogeneity between agents through their
three personal traits (c1i, c2i for c3i), unique to each agent, on how they com-
bine information to form their opinion. Another important well-documented
heterogeneity is that different people have different risk aversions. We capture
this trait by assuming that each agent is characterized by a fixed threshold
ωi, controlling the triggering of an investment action, given her opinion level
ωi(t). An agent i decides to go long (buy a stock) if her conviction ωi(t) is
sufficiently positive so as to reach the threshold: ωi(t) ≥ ωi. Reversely, she
decides to go short (sell a stock) if ωi(t) ≤ −ωi. Thus, we assume symmetric
levels of conviction in order for a trade to occur either on the buy or sell sides.
The parameter ωi captures one dimension of the agent’s risk aversion: how
much certitude she needs to break her hesitation and move into the market.
The larger her threshold ωi, the larger certitude about future price movements
the agent requires in order to start trading. Each agent is characterized by a
different ωi, drawn randomly from a uniform distribution in the interval [0,Ω].
As previously discussed in section 2.1, our agents are liquidity constrained.
The portfolio of an agent i at time t is the sum of her cash cashi(t) and of the
number stocksi(t) of the single asset that is traded in our artificial market.
When an agent decides to buy, she uses a fixed fraction g of her cash. When
an agent decides to sell, she sells the same fixed fraction g of the value of her
stocks. The fact that g is much smaller than 1 ensures time diversification.
Our main results do not change significantly as long as g does not approach 1.
Our agents are not allowed to borrow, because they can only buy a new stock,
when they have the cash. Reciprocally, we impose short-sell constraints, in the
sense that an agent can only sell a stock she owns. Thus, our model is related
to the literature investigating the role of short-sale constraints (Miller, 1977;
Chen et al., 2002; Ofek and Richardson, 2003).
These rules can be summarized in terms of the direction si(t) of the trading
decision and the volume vi(t) (in units of number of stock shares) of the agent
i:
- if ωi(t) > ωi : si(t) = +1 (buying)
vi(t) = g ·
cashi(t)
p(t−1)
- if ωi(t) < −ωi : si(t) = −1 (selling)
vi(t) = g · stocksi(t),
where p(t) is the price of the asset at time t. When an agent is buying as-
sets, her order volume vi(t) is determined by her available cash and by the
stock share price p(t − 1) at the previous time step (the main results remain
unchanged if agents would use the expected p(t) instead). Our agents are sub-
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mitting market orders, such that the price to pay to realize an order is the
new price p(t) determined by the market maker. This new price is determined
by the price clearing mechanism that aggregates the excess demand after all
the traders have submitted theirs decisions.
2.5 Price clearing condition
Once all the agents have decided on their orders, the new price of the asset is
determined by the following equations:
r(t) =
1
λ ·N
N∑
i=1
si(t) · vi(t) (2)
log [price(t)] = log [price(t− 1)] + r(t) , (3)
where λ represents the relative impact of the excess demand upon the price, i.e.
the market depth. Similar to (Beja and Goldman, 1980; Wyart and Bouchaud,
2007), we neglect all higher order contributions in expression (2) and use a
linear market impact function, as a rough approximation at time scales sig-
nificantly larger than the tick-per-tick time scales for which nonlinear impact
functions are observed (Plerou et al., 2002).
Expressions (2) and (3) can be interpreted in two ways. One is that the trading
is performed through a market maker, disposing of an unlimited amount of
cash and stocks. Agents submit all their market orders to the market maker,
who, after adapting the price to the excess demand, executes all the agents’
trades. Because the market maker adapts the price before he executes the
trades, he has a competitive advantage and gets on average a significant pos-
itive return for his service.
An alternative interpretation is that the trading style of our agents is midterm
to longterm trading, excluding high-frequency traders like hedge-funds and
such. Once our agents have absorbed their information and taken a trading
decision, the price has already changed due to faster agents using similar
trading information.
2.6 Cash and stock positions
We assume a frictionless market with no transaction fees. Once the return and
the new price are determined by the market clearing equations (2,3), the cash
and number of stocks held by each agent i are updated according to
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cashi(t) = cashi(t− 1)− si(t) vi(t) p(t) (4)
stocksi(t) = stocksi(t− 1) + si(t) vi(t). (5)
2.7 Adaptation
As described above, agents have pre-existing heterogeneous beliefs on the re-
liability of the three different sources of information, quantified by their three
traits c1/2/3i. In addition, we assume that agents adapt their belief concerning
the credibility of the news n(t) and their trust in the advice Ei[sj(t)] of their
social contacts, according to time-dependent weights u(t) and kij(t), which
take into account their recent past performance. Specifically, an agent esti-
mates the value of a source of information by the correlation between the
source’s prediction and the realized return. For their strategy to be adapted
to the current market regime, agents prioritize recent data in their calibra-
tion of the correlation. This prioritization of recent data is supported, first, by
behavioral findings stating that individuals tend to overweight recent informa-
tion and underweight prior data, second, by practitioners, who calibrate their
trading strategies with recent data. The implementation of this prioritization
is achieved by a standard auto-regressive update:
u(t)=αu(t− 1) + (1− α)n(t− 1)
r(t)
σr
(6)
kij(t) =α kij(t− 1) + (1− α)Ei[sj(t− 1)]
r(t)
σr
(7)
Choosing 0 < α < 1 and with 0 < σr
2 , the correct prediction of the sign of the
realized stock return r(t) from a given information source tends to reinforce
the trust in that source of information, all the more so, the larger the return
(scaled by its volatility σr) and the larger the strength of the signal. The
time scale 1/| ln(α)| sets the memory duration over which past performance
continues to impact the adaptive trust coefficients u(t) and kij(t). The update
of u and kij via eq. (6) and (7) is performed at every time step.
2 σr is in fact σr(t), with σr(t)
2 = α · σr(t− 1)
2 + (1−α) · (r(t− 1)− 〈r(t)〉)2 and
〈r(t)〉 = α · 〈r(t− 1)〉 + (1− α) · r(t− 1).
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3 Results of the model
3.1 General properties
Our model is an idealized “test tube” representation of a financial market and
given the simplifications put into the model, we do not aim at reproducing
faithful statistical characteristics of realistic price dynamics. Our objective is
to obtain an understanding of how the interplay of news, herding and private
information can lead to the formation of bubbles and crashes. We first point
out a few properties of the model, that derive straightforwardly from our set-
up.
Because we model a closed system, with no new influx of money or stocks
after the initial endowment of cash(0) and stocks(0), there cannot be any
money/wealth creation in the long run 3 . As a consequence, the price trajec-
tory has an upper and lower bound 4 . The constraints on cash and stocks tend
to push the price back to its initial value, price(0) = 1, such that the price
performs a mean-reverting random walk 5 around its initial value, which will
be refereed to in the following as the equilibrium price.
The adaptive process of our agents essentially consists in looking for persistent
sources of information, which impact on the returns. In more detail: for a trade
to be profitable, an agent has to first acquire a number of asset (at time t),
then its value has then to increase in the following time step, explaining the
offset of one time step between the information source and the realized return
in eq. (6) and (7). The return r(t+1) is however influenced by the information
sources at time t+ 1, and not by those at time t, on which agents based their
prediction of r(t+1). This means that, for an information source to have some
real predicting power, it must have some persistence (c.f. Appendix for a more
detailed explanation of this mechanism).
3 Strictly speaking, the model suffers however from a slight money destruction
due to the price setting mechanism with the market maker in which the log(price)
change is linear in the excess demand. But the number of purchased stocks depends
on the real price (=exp(log(price))). Therefore, a rapid increase followed by a slow
decrease of the price decreases the total wealth of the system, by the concavity of
the logarithmic function. This effect is essentially negligible.
4 The upper bound is reached once agents have exhausted all their cash. The lower
bound is then the agents are all in cash.
5 The increments of the walk are however not distributed according to a normal law,
but to a distribution with fatter tails (c.f. figure 1) due to the adaptive strategies
of the agents.
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3.2 First results
In our simulations, we fix the number of agents in the system to N = 2500,
the market depth to λ = 0.25, the maximal individual conviction threshold
to Ω = 2.0, the fraction of their cash or stocks that investors trade per action
to g = 2%, the initial amount of cash and stocks held by each agent to
cashi(0) = 1 and stocksi(0) = 1, and the memory discount factor to α =
0.95, corresponding to a characteristic time of 1/| ln(α)| ≈ 20 time steps. The
news are modeled by i.i.d. Gaussian noise. Setting C1 = C2 = C3 = 1.0,
figure 1 shows a typical realization of the time evolution of the log-price p(t),
the one-time-step return r(t), the prediction performance of the news, u(t)
and the ensemble average of the prediction performance of the neighbors,
〈kij〉(t). The middle right panel shows the distribution of returns with clear
evidence of a non-Gaussian fat tail structure. The lower right panel shows
the absence of correlation between returns together with the presence of non-
negligible correlation of the volatility (here measured as the absolute value of
the returns), which confirms the clear evidence of clustered volatility in the
time series of one-time-step returns.
While the perceived predicting power of the news, u(t), fluctuates around its
mean value of 0, it should be noted that it exhibits significant non-zero values,
indicating that agents sometimes give a lot of importance to the news. If the
agents were fully aware of the i.i.d. properties of the news, they would not use
them 6 . But because of the adaptive nature of their strategy to the current
market regime, agents do not use the complete price and news time series to
update their trust into the news, but only recent data points 7 . Due to the use
of a finite data set, the i.i.d. news may occasionally show persistence 8 , leeding
to an increase of u(t) as consequence. The statistical fluctuations associated
with the random patterns that are always presents in genuine noise is misin-
terpreted by the agents as genuine predictability. It is the local optimization,
that makes the agents see causality, where there is only randomness (Taleb,
2008).
The lower left panel of figure 1 shows the average propensity to imitate, which
also fluctuates around 0. But, the amplitude of these fluctuations is much
reduced compared to those of u(t). This is because each agent updates indi-
vidually her propensity to imitate her neighbors according to (7), so that the
6 Recall that the return r(t+ 1) is influenced by the news at time t+ 1 on which
agents based their prediction of r(t + 1), and not by those at time t. Because the
news have no true persistence, they can not have true predictive power.
7 The weight of a data point in the update of u(t) decreases exponentially with
increasing age with a time scale ∼ 1/| ln(α)|.
8 Our agents do not have a PhD in Econometrics and they do not perform proper
statistical tests of their hypotheses.
13
statistical average 〈kij〉(t) is performed over the whole heterogenous popula-
tion of agents, compared with no average for u(t) which is common knowledge
to all agents.
The crucial parameters of our model are the parameters C1, C2, C3, which
control the level of heterogeneity and the a priori preference for the three
different types of information. Changing these parameters changes the way
the agents behave in ways that we now explore systematically.
3.3 C1-dependence
Each agent is endowed with a fixed individual preference level, c1i, controlling
how much she takes into account the information stemming from the actions
of their neighbors. This level is different from agent to agent, and is drawn
from a uniform distribution in the interval [0, C1]. Thus, the parameter C1
sets the maximal and mean ( = C1/2) innate weight, that agents give to their
social influences.
Figure 2, plots the evolution of several variables for three different values of
C1, all other parameters, including the seed of the random number generator,
remaining the same. For vanishing propensity to imitate (C1 = 0), some price
spikes can be observed, which are generated by the news only, whose influence
can be amplified by the positive feedback resulting from adaptation that tends
to increase the relevance that investors attribute to news after a lucky run of
news of the same signs. For C1 = 2.0, one can observe that these peaks are
amplified due to the imitation now also contributing to the agents’ actions.
For C1 = 4.0, a qualitatively different price evolution appears. For such large
values of the maximal susceptibility to their social environment, the price is
driven to its extremes, its dynamics being only slowed down by the agents’
finite cash and stock portfolio reaching their boundaries. We show below that
this extreme behaviors results from a self-fulfilling prophecy, enabled through
social interactions.
To better illustrate the effect of increasing C1, the third panel in figure 2 shows
the average weight factor 〈kij〉(t)
9 used by the agents to assess the relevance of
the information stemming from their neighbors. By increasing C1, agents are
by definition more susceptible to their neighbors’ opinions, making them more
likely to act in the same way if they show some predictive power. Consequently,
since the price dynamics is governed by the aggregate demand, herding in
opinions leads to persistent returns, creating the very returns agents hoped for,
which reinforce the prediction power of their neighbors in a positive feedback
loop. With 〈kij〉(t) and C1 large, the opinions of the agents are completely
9 〈kij〉(t) =
1
N ·J
∑N
i=1
∑J
j=1 kij(t)
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shaped by their social component, while the news and their idiosyncratic term
are essentially ignored. Due to this positive feedback loop, a small predictive
success of some agents can trigger an avalanche of self-fulfilling prophecies,
leading to price dynamics completely unrelated to the news and to large price
deviations from the assets to its equilibrium value.
3.4 The existence of two regimes
The existence of a bifurcation beyond which a new regime appears is docu-
mented in figure 3(left), where the maximum value of 〈kij〉(t), averaged over
many realizations and simulated with the same parameters C2 = C3 = 1, is
plotted as a function of C1. One can observe a rather abrupt transition oc-
curring at around C1 = 3. This transition is related to the phase transition
of the Ising model, on which our model is based. Due to the presence of the
adaption induced feedback loops, and with the dynamical character of 〈kij〉(t),
the precise nature of this transition can not be asserted. The existence of this
change of regime explains the radical difference of properties shown in figure
2 for C1 = 0, 2 to C1 = 4. The jump in 〈kij〉(t) at C1 ≈ 3 is mirrored by a
similar transition in the values of the maximal draw-downs (sum of consecu-
tive negative returns) and draw-ups (sum of consecutive positive returns) as a
function of C1 in figure 3(right). For C1 > 3, a second regime is revealed where
very large price moves occur. These market events are fundamentally different
from the price fluctuations in the regime for C1 < 3. These large price changes
are reminiscent of the “outliers” documented by Johansen and Sornette (1998,
2001) and Sornette (2003a), and recently extended into the concept of “dragon-
kings” (Sornette, 2009).
3.4.1 The efficient regime
For C1 < 3, agents do not attribute sufficient importance to their neighbors
in order to trigger the feedback loop that would lead to strong synchronized
actions as occurs for large C1’s. For small C1, the market is approximately
efficient, in the sense that there is no autocorrelation of returns, as shown in
figure 1, and the price fluctuates rather closely around its equilibrium value.
While the major source of fluctuations are the news modeled as a Gaussian
white noise process, the price fluctuations develop strong non-Gaussian fea-
tures, as a result of the combined effect of the adaptive process that tends to
amplify runs of same signed news and of the propensity to imitate that leads
to small but non-negligible collective behaviors.
A first interesting conclusion can be drawn that our model provides a natural
setting for rationalizing the excess volatility puzzle (Shiller, 1981), through
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the adaptive process of our agents. It could be argued that our setting is too
simplified and unrealistic. But, how do real investors, traders, fund managers
access the value their investment decisions? Necessarily by performing some
kind of comparisons between the realized performance and some benchmarks,
which can be a market portfolio, the results of competitors, the ex-ante ex-
pectations, all the above or others. The adaptive process used by our agents
is arguably a simple and straightforward embodiment of the tendency for in-
vestors to adjust their strategies on the basis of past recent performance, here
on how well the news predicted the market returns. Because measurements
are noisy, the resulting estimation leads unavoidably to an amplification of the
intrinsic variability of the news into a much strong variability of the prices,
i.e., to the excess volatility effect. Somewhat paradoxically, it is the attempt
of industrious investors to continuously adapt to the current market situation,
which leads to the dramatic amplification of the price volatility. This may be
thought of as another embodiment of the “illusion of control” effect, found
in the Minority and the Parrondo games (Satinover and Sornette, 2007a,b,
2009), according to which sophisticated strategies are found to under-perform
simple ones.
3.4.2 The excitable regime
A population of agents characterized by C1 > 3, represents the situation in
which many agents know that their idiosyncratic information and the news are
incomplete. In order to compensate for this lack of information, agents tend
to imitate the actions of successful acquaintances. Under these conditions,
the average propensity to imitate, 〈kij〉(t), exhibits extreme values, resulting
in large price deviations from the equilibrium price and periods of persistent
returns, as shown in figure 2. In this regime, the market is in an excitable
state. By imitating the opinions of recent winners who profited from some
departure of the market price from its equilibrium value, our agents tend to
amplify this anomaly, further strengthening the attraction of this strategy for
other agents, eventually ending in a bubble and crash.
The triggering event responsible for the increasing weight that agents entrust
to their neighbors’ opinions is nothing but the random occurrence of a sequence
of same signed news. As explained in section 3.2, the weight u(t) of the news
in their opinions is increased when the agents perceive a pattern of persistence
in the news, which also induces persistent returns. Then, the agents reassess
their belief and give more importance to the news. Because the pattern of
persistence of the news is common knowledge, this tends to align the decisions
and actions of the agents. As a consequence, their aggregate impact makes
happen the very belief that initially led to their actions, thus increasing the
prediction power of the agents’ opinions. As a whole, the agents see that
the opinion of their friends is accurate, thus tending to increase their trust.
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This increase in the propensity 〈kij〉(t) to imitate can lead to a cascade of
trading activity, resulting in the rise of a bubble, as described in details in the
appendix. This scenario is a cartoon representation of the well-documented
fact that many bubbles start initially with a change of economic fundamentals.
Translated in our agent-based model, this change of economic fundamentals is
nothing but the streak of same signed news that tells the story of an increasing
market (for positive news). This small positive bias can be sufficient to nucleate
a process that eventually blossom into a full-fledged bubble. The corresponding
amplification of the news put the price on an unsustainable trajectory. This
occurs especially when the system lives in the excitable state, in which the
price can easily overshoot the values implied by the good/bad news.
Once such a cascade has begun and the best strategy is to follow the herd,
agents are, in the case of a bubble, buying stocks at every time step and push-
ing the price up till they have no money left to further increase the price. At
this point, their predicting power decreases due to they decreasing impact on
the returns and the cascade ends. As financial bubbles feed on new money
pouring in the market, the lack of new liquidity is a well-known factor of in-
stability for financial bubbles (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Hussam et al.,
2008). Following this buying phase, the portfolio of agents consists mainly of
stocks, biasing their actions towards selling. Now, some randomly occurring
negative news are sufficient to trigger a reverse cascade, the crash, leading to
an overshoot of the price below its equilibrium value. This scenario provides
a clear distinction between the fundamental cause of the crash (the unsta-
ble high position of the price that has dried up all liquidity available) and
the triggering proximal factor (a random occurrence of a sequence of negative
news). In line with many observations, crashes in our model do not need a
dramatic piece of negative information. Only a trickle can trigger a flood once
the market as a whole has evolved into an unsustainable unstable position.
Due to the symmetry between buying and selling in our model, the price can,
starting from its equilibrium value, depart in either direction, creating either
a bubble (over-valuation of the asset over an extended period of time) or an
negative bubble (under-valuation of the asset). This deviation will then be
ended by either a crash (fast drop in price after a bubble) or a rally (fast
appreciation after a negative bubble). In our analysis, we concentrate on the
case of bubbles followed by a crash, because this is the more common sce-
nario. The reason for this is twofold. First, in real markets, short-selling can
occur, but is not equally available to all market players. The second reason has
behavioral origins. In a bullish regime, people are progressively attracted to
invest in financial markets, tending to push the price upward. Once invested,
their attention is more focused on the financial markets. Fear and greed often
lead to over-reactions and possible panics when the sentiments become neg-
ative, triggering herd selling which self-fulfills the very fears at their origin
(Veldkamp, 2005).
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Another interesting characteristic of the herding regime occurring for C1 > 3 is
that it is very difficult to diagnose this regime from the properties of the price
recorded outside those transient episodes of booms or crashes. Indeed, outside
these special moments of “exuberance”, the market behaves as if in the regime
C1 < 3. Bubbles and crashes do not belong to the normal regular dynamics
of the model. They are only experienced when certain conditions are fulfilled,
as explained above, that combine to create these transient instabilities. They
can thus be considered as “outliers” in the sense of Johansen and Sornette
(1998, 2001), or using a better more colorful terminology, they are “dragon-
kings” (Sornette, 2009). The statistical analysis of the distribution of f 〈kij〉(t)
confirms this claim. Figure 5 shows the appearance of an extremely fat tail
in the distribution of 〈kij〉(t) over the ensemble of different realizations as a
function of time for C1 = 4, while its bulk remains approximately identical
to the distribution obtained for the smaller values of C1 below the critical
threshold ≃ 3. This confirms the existence of a class of transient regimes, the
booms and crashes, which coexisting with the normal dynamics of the prices.
The hidden nature of the regime associated with C1 > 3 and the random oc-
currence of triggering news lead to the prediction that advanced diagnostics of
bubbles and crashes should lead to numerous false alarms. Consider the study
of Kaminsky (1998), who has compiled a large list of indicators of financial
crises, suggested by the fundamentalist literature on the period from 1970 to
1995 for 20 countries. Out of the 102 financial crises in her database, she finds
that the specificity of the indicators is quite low: only 39% of the ex-ante di-
agnostics coincided with a crisis, suggesting that fundamental reasons should
be expanded by behavioural ones to explain the emergence of crises.
We thus come to our second important conclusion: the present model provides
a simple mechanism for the existence of two populations in the distribution
of prices, exemplifying the concept that booms and crashes are qualitatively
different from the rest of the price moves. The second population of boom-
crash (dragon-kings) appears when the innate propensity to herd reaches a
threshold above which a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop starts to oper-
ate intermittently.
3.5 C2-dependence
Figures 3 displays the impact of C2, the a priori importance of the news, onto
the transition from the efficient to the excitable regime. Both panels show
that the more the agents trust the news, the stronger C1 has to be for the
system to become excitable. With increasing C2-values, we also observe that
the transition becomes smoother and the maximum 〈kij〉(t) is decreased. This
corresponds well to the intuition that, if traders are well informed and believe
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that the news correctly describe the economy, such drastic over- and under-
valuations are less likely to happen and a higher level of panic is needed for a
crash to happen.
3.6 α-dependence
Although the presence of the α-parameter is crucial, its specific value (within
a certain range below 1) has only a minor importance. Recall that α sets
the time-scale of the market regime, since it controls the length of the time
series that is used to estimate the predicting power of the different information
sources. The fact that α < 1, i.e. that agents’ strategies are designed to identify
local market regimes is the reason that makes them possible in the first place.
It is the local adaptation, which is the true origin of a bubble and a subsequent
crash.
Figure 4 shows the impact of α on the transition from the efficient to the
excitable regime. The closer α is to 1, the larger the critical C1 for which the
system becomes excitable. With a larger memory, the growth of the propensity
〈kij〉(t) to imitate is more limited because the agents see now much better the
bigger picture and are less easily carried away by a temporal coordination
of their neighbors. Changing α leaves the maximal drawn-downs and -ups
unchanged because, once an coordination of the agents starts, the only way
to stop it is via the drying up of their cash/stock-reservoir.
3.7 Alternative clearing condition
We have played with variations of the implementations of the clearing condi-
tions with different market maker’ strategies. For instance, when the market
make is adapting the price after (rather than before) the exchange of assets
with the agents, we find the same qualitative results and bubbles and crashes
occur by the same mechanism. With such an price clearing condition however,
news bear real predictive power, destroying the efficiency of the market.
In general, the present model is very robust with respect to changes in the
different ingredients. As long as agents can interact and are locally optimizing
their strategies, bubbles and crashes do appear.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed two major questions:
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- Why do bubbles and crashes exist?
- How to they emerge?
We approached these questions by constructing a model of bounded ratio-
nal, locally optimizing agents, trading a single asset with a very parsimonious
strategy. The actions of the agents are determined by their anticipation of
the future price changes, which is based on three different sources of infor-
mation: private information, public information (news) and information from
their neighbors in their network of professional acquaintance. Given these in-
formation, they try to maximize their usefulness by constantly scanning the
market and adjusting the weight of the different sources to their opinion by
the recent predicting performance of these sources. In this way, they are al-
ways adapting their strategy to the current market regime, such that they can
profit from an opportunity if it arises.
We find that two regimes appear, depending on how strong the agents are
influenced by their neighbors (controlled by the parameter C1). In the regime
of small C1’s, the low herding/efficient regime, agents are sometimes more
influenced by the news and sometimes more by their neighbors, but due to
the small level of trust they put into their neighbors by default, they do not get
carried away in over-imitating their neighbors if the latter, for a short time
interval, seem to be good predictors. The returns are mostly driven by the
global and idiosyncratic news. The resulting market is approximately efficient,
with the price not deviating much from its equilibrium value.
We find that the return distribution is however quite different from that de-
scribing the exogenous news. Our simple agents are able to transform the
string of independent normally distributed news (both for the global and id-
iosyncratic news) into a return distribution with fatter than exponential tails,
showing a clear sign of excess volatility. Also clustered volatility and a non-zero
autocorrelation in the volatility of the returns are observed while the returns
themselves remain uncorrelated, in agreement with absence of arbitrage op-
portunities (at least at the linear correlation level). These different properties
show that our simple model can reproduce some important stylized facts of
the stock market, and can motivate the possibility to test its prediction in
other market regimes.
By increasing C1 above a certain critical value, the system enters a second
regime where the agents give on average more importance to their neighbors’
actions than to the other pieces of information. By increasing the awareness
of their neighbors’ actions, agents are more likely to coordinate their actions,
which increases the probability that the direction of the return results in the
predicted direction, which then again increases their trust in these successful
predicting neighbors. Due to this positive feedback loop, the average coeffi-
cients 〈kij〉 (the dynamic trust of agent i in agent j) can surpass a critical value
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and the agents’ opinions are dominated by only this information term, result-
ing in series of consistently large same-signed returns. Because the agents are
always trying to maximize their returns, it is rational for the agents to follow
the majority and to “surf” the bubble or the crash. This regime is characterized
by large deviations from the equilibrium price resulting from a coordination of
the agents’ actions due to their local adaptation of their strategy to the mood
of the market. Not only is it rational to follow the herd, we have also showed
(in the appendix) that the agents who are early imitators of their successful
neighbors in the early stage of a bubble/crash are those who will accumulate
the largest wealth among all the agents after the market has returned to its
normal regime.
We showed that the origin of these large deviations from the equilibrium price
nucleate from the news. A random occurrence of a sequence of same signed
news pushes the price in one direction and starts the coordination process of
the agents. This situation is reminiscent from the mechanism for the initiation
of real world bubbles, where an innovation leads to a period with a majority of
positive news, which also move the market. Because the reason of the positive
market move is an innovation, the agents are not entirely sure of its intrinsic
value and seek advice from some of their professional collegues. If those col-
leagues tell them that they made large profits with this asset and they trust
these colleagues, they will follow their advice, resulting in the same kind of
behavior as produced by our model.
By following each other’s actions, the agents push the price up, beyond its
equilibrium value, up to an unsustainable level. Once the hype has cooled of
and the agents have invested all their cash into the stock, just a little push
by negative news can cause the price to collapse, resulting in a crash, without
any apparent reason.
By increasing the prior propensity C1 to imitate to a high value, the average
behavior and properties of the dynamics of the model is unchanged. Outside of
these large price variations occurring during rare bubbles and crashes, the dy-
namics looks similar to that documented in the low C1 regime, i.e., appears to
function like an efficient market. Therefore, attempting to estimate the value
of C1 just from the normal price dynamics is essentially impossible. The oc-
currence of a bubble/crash is an event that has drastically different statistical
characteristics than the normal price fluctuations, exemplifying the occurrence
of “outliers” (or “dragon-kings”) that have been documented empirically for
financial draw-downs (Johansen and Sornette, 1998, 2001; Sornette, 2003a).
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Fig. 1. This figure shows a typical realization of the major observables of the system.
These observables are the time evolution of the price p(t) (upper left panel), the
one-time-step return r(t) in black with clear evidence of clustered volatility (upper
right panel) together with the news, n(t), in the background in red, the news weight
factor u(t) (middle left panel) and propensity 〈kij(t)〉 to imitate (lower left panel).
The middle right panel shows the distribution of returns: the linear-log scales would
qualify a Gaussian distribution as an inverted parabola, a double-exponential as a
double tent made of two straight lines; in contrast, one can observe a strong upward
curvature in the tail of this distribution, qualifying a fat-tail property compatible
with a stretched exponential or power law. The lower right panel shows the absence
of correlation between returns together with the presence of non-negligible correla-
tion of the volatility (here measured as the absolute value of the returns). Note the
positive value of the correlation of the volatility up to a time about 25 time steps, fol-
lowed by a small negative value up to 80 time steps. The time scale of the correlation
of volatility is set by the memory factor α = 0.95 corresponding to a characteristic
time scale of 20 time steps. These results are obtained for C1 = C2 = C3 = 1.0, and
frozen weights attributed by the agents to the three information sources drawn out
of a uniform distribution from 0 to C1, C2, C3, respectively. The histogram and the
correlation data are computed out of a realization with 6 · 104 time steps.
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Fig. 2. Evolution of several variables for C1 = 0.0, 2.0, 4.0 with the other parameters
unchanged, including the random seed for the three realizations, resulting in the
same realization of the news for the different runs (shown in the bottom panel).
Other parameters are: N = 2500, C2 = C3 = 1.0, Ω = 2.0, α = 0.95, λ = 0.25,
g = 0.02.
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Fig. 3. Impact of C2, the innate susceptibility to the news, onto the transition from
the efficient to the excitable regime in function of C1, the innate susceptibility to
neighbors’ actions. The transitionis measured by the maximal value of 〈kij〉(t) (the
recent prediction performance of agents’ neighbors) (left) and the extremal draw–
down and -ups (sum of consecutive same signed returns)(right), both averaged over
many realizations. Both plots show that with increasing C2, the critical C1-value
increases and the transition smoothens. Other parameters are: N = 104, C3 = 1.0,
Ω = 2.0, α = 0.95, λ = 0.25, g = 0.02.
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Fig. 4. Same as figure 3, except that C2 is fixed at 1.0 and that the impact of α,
which fixes the length of the time-span over which agents measure the predicting
power of the different sources of information, is investigated. For larger α, the critical
C1-value increases, the transition smoothens and the largest possible 〈kij〉(t) values
is decreased.Other parameters are: N = 104, C3 = 1.0, Ω = 2.0, λ = 0.25, g = 0.02.
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Fig. 5. Normalized histogram of 〈kij〉(t) for different values of C1.
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Appendix
A Detailed analysis of the emergence of a bubble
To clarify the mechanisms leading to the dynamics of the here presented model,
we now illustrate some details on the micro-scale dynamics of the model. First
we will go step-by-step through an occurrence of increased volatility, shown in
figure A.1, with the system being in the efficient regime and explain in detail
the relationships between the different variables.
Second, we will investigate the emergence of a bubble in the excitable regime
and compare it to the dynamics resulting from the same stream of news in
the efficient regime in figure A.2 and A.3.
A.1 Step-by-step description of the dynamics in the efficient regime
Figure A.1 displays the dynamics of the key variables around the time t = 800,
where the price suddenly, crashes, rebounds and then slowly relaxes to its
pre-existing level. An increase of u(t), the news’ performance and 〈kij〉(t), the
average weight used by the agents to assess the relevance of the information
stemming from their neighbors, is occurring at the same time.
The origin of this burst can be traced back to the random occurrence of
a sequence of same signed news, shown in the lower right panel of figure
A.1. Recall that we assume that the news are independently and identically
distributed. Thus the dip structure in the news’ realization is purely “bad
luck”, i.e. a stream of small bad news impact the market. The response of the
agents to these run of bad news develops as follows. The observation of the
news n(t) gives the agents an information about the next return r(t+ 1), but
in order to profit from this insight, the agents have to act before t + 1, i.e.
they use n(t) to buy or sell at time t. Therefore, a burst of activity, which has
its origin in the news, can only occur if the sign of the news is, by chance, the
same for several time steps as it is the case from t = 799 to 809.
Let us report minutely the micro dynamics of the model to better understand
this burst of activity. At t = 799, the news turns out to be negative, which
suggests to the agents that the price may drop from t = 800 to t = 801. To
prevent their portfolio from losing in value from time t = 800 to t = 801,
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some agents reduce their exposure to the market and sell a fraction gof their
assets at t = 799. If enough agents listen to the news, as it is in this case,
this selling will result in a negative return from t = 799 to t = 800. Then at
t = 800, the news is, by chance, again negative resulting again in a negative
return from t = 800 to t = 801. This negative return confirms the negative
news from t = 799, leading agents to increase u(t), the weight they attribute
to the news.
The exponential growth of the weight u continues as long as the sequence of
negative news goes on, further amplifying the impact of the news on the agents’
decision and therefore on the price. Note that the average weight 〈kij〉(t) of
the propensity to imitate also exhibits a fast acceleration. This is due to the
fact that the agents find that imitation is also a good predictor of the returns,
since a majority of agents are following the news and are trading into the
same direction. By this process, there is an amplification of the response of
the whole herd to the exogenous news. When the run of bad news stops, it
takes about ≃ 1/ ln(α) ≈ 20 times steps for u to relax back to its previous
value. In this example, the maximum of u(t) occurs at t = 807. At t = 808,
u decreases lightly due to the small amplitude of the news at t = 807. Once
u has reached a certain level, the news completely dominates agents opinion
and thus also determines the returns.
At t = 810, the sequence of negative news is terminated by positive news,
resulting in a large positive return due to the large value of u(t). Furthermore,
as the news at t = 809 predicted a negative return at t = 810, the predictive
power of the news seems to have decreased, having a a decrease of u(t) as
consequence. Now that the news resumes its usual random switching signs
and it is no longer a good predictor of the return, u decreases exponentially.
This case study illustrates that the occurrence of bursts of price variations
is nothing but the amplification of runs of same-sign news, which leads to
an exponential growth of the news weighting factor u, which itself increases
dramatically the sensitivity of the agents to all future news. This heightened
sensitivity lasts over a characteristic scale determined by the coefficient α
governing the memory of the adaptation process (eq. 7). The process of agents’
adaptation to the news and information from their neighbors, together with
the random lucky or unlucky occurrence of runs of news of the same quality,
is at the origin of the occurrence of this period of increase volatility.
A.2 Efficient regime vs excitable regime
In figure A.2, we plot the detailed dynamics during the nucleation of a bubble.
The black continuous lines display the evolution of several variables with the
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system being in the efficient regime, i.e. C1 = C2 = C3 = 1.0. The red dashed
lines represent the same variables, with all parameters unchanged (including
random seed), except that agents susceptibility to their neighbors’ actions is
increased (C1 = 4.0) such that the system is in the excitable regime. Figure
A.2 shows the detailed nucleation of the bubble, whereas figure A.3 shows the
dynamics on a larger time scale.
In the second panel on the left in figure A.2, we plot the evolution of the return
and witness a burst of volatility starting around t = 930. The origin of this
volatility can be attributed to a random occurrence of some ‘persistence’ in
the news n(t), as explained in the previous section. This persistence increases
the news’ prediction power u(t) and, because all agents are subject to the
same news, agents’ actions tend to synchronize, inducing an increase of the
prediction power of their neighbors, 〈kij〉(t).
Up to t = 957, the dynamics of the system in the efficient regime only deviates
marginally from those of the excitable regime. After t = 957, their differences
become apparent. In the excitable regime, where the neighbors’ influence is a
stronger factor in the opinion formation, the long string of positive news from
t = 957 to t = 969 is able to increase the average interaction weight 〈kij〉(t)
up to a level high enough, such that the opinion of the agents, and therefore
also their actions, are dominated by their neighbors’. As a consequence, the
price continues to increase even after the positive news sequence has ended. In
the efficient regime, on the other hand, the volatility of the returns, u(t) and
〈kij〉(t) return to their normal values after the ‘luck streak’ of positive news.
In the excitable regime, as a consequence of the strong propensity to interact ,
once a price rally or a crash is started, the dominating impact of the herd both
in the adaption process and in the price impact makes the price trend self-
reinforcing and basically independent of the sign of the news. This explains
the very large amplitude of the price deviation compared with the price in the
efficient regime in figure A.2 and A.3.
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Fig. A.1. Time series of several key variables showing the response to the news for
C1 = 1 (efficient regime) and C2 = C3 = 1.0. Upper left panel: a portion of the
price time series with a drop and rebound. Upper right panel: a magnification of the
upper left panel around the increased volatility. Middle left panel: the time series of
the returns. Middle right panel: the weight u(t) of the news showing a fast growth
over the time interval in which the news are all negative, followed by a decay over a
time scale given by 1/ ln(α) ≈ 20 time steps. Lower left panel: The average weight
〈kij〉(t) of the propensity to imitate also exhibits a fast acceleration followed by a
slower decay. Lower right panel: the time series of news, generated as a white noise,
which can nevertheless exhibit runs of same-sign values.
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Fig. A.2. Time series of several key variables showing the response to the news for
C1 = C2 = C3 = 1.0 (efficient regime, in black) and C1 = 4 with C2 = C3 = 1.0
(excitable regime, red dashed). We can observe that the random occurrence of per-
sistence in the news stating around t = 930, initiates a bubble if agents give too
much weight to their neighbors’ actions.
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Fig. A.3. Magnification of the realization of the crash shown in figure A.2. Top to
bottom: plots of the price, return, activity, news weight factor and average imitation
factor, as a function of time.
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